Over at New Cool Thang there is yet an other discussion of free will. I'll just be doing science blogging starting tomorrow, so I wanted to address this issue first. The question that came up was over Dennett's recent paper. I agree he is being a bit polemical. (No surprise for those familiar with him) However I think there is an interesting core to the question Dennet raises. That is, why are people so committed to a belief in certain views of free will. In the course of the discussion I said that "by the papers I've read I’ve yet to read a particularly strong argument for free will that doesn't rest on (a) our psychological desire for free will or (b) some theological point. If you disagree point me to the argument. I don’t think it arrogant to say one hasn’t found any compelling arguments." Blake disagreed and presented several arguments. Allow me to address those here rather than at New Cool Thang, due to length.
First, let me point out that I am looking for objective arguments - i.e. not those that tie to some emotional or theological belief. There may be arguments that are persuasive to me, but primarily due to my commitments that may not entirely be well supported themselves in terms of public evidence.
(1) immediate experience of being able to choose one thing or another and the overwhelming sense of having actions that are up to me;
(2) the very notion of the will as active;
(3) moral responsibily;
(4) the fact that we cannot predict what a person will say do or think even with intimate knowledge of that person;
(5) we deliberate;
(6) we undertake purposive behavior aimed at a telos which does not yet exist; and
(7) we cannot pragmatically live life based on the belief that everything is determined and everything we think, do, say and write was already entailed by the earlier states.
(1) simply is the claim that since we believe we choose that we obviously are choosing in terms of a particular metaphysical kind of free will. I don't see how that logically follows in the least. I agree that we believe actions are up to me and that we choose. However belief alone is not a good ground for reality. I believe many things and many of my beliefs are wrong. It seems odd to tie an epistemological claim of justification on the belief conditions. If we can do this then all my beliefs provide their own justification because they are my beliefs.
It's hard to take that claim seriously.
Undermining this further is that most intuitive beliefs regarding physical basis for things are wrong. Folk psychology is largely wrong. Folk physics is largely wrong. On that basis there is deep reason to distrust our folk beliefs regarding free will without further argument. Which was what I was initially asking for.
(2) is really just a form of (1), only if anything weaker. To say something is active simply doesn't entail Libertarian freedom. Here the appeal is not to our beliefs but to an idea. But surely ideas don't entail their own justification. Further is this a culturally constrained idea? That is do all cultures share it? If not, why should our culture be the basis for justification? Much more is needed.
(3) This pushing the question back a stage without answering it. Moral responsibility depends upon free will but we don't know that we have moral responsibility in a public, objective way. This is compelling only as a theological or quasi-theological claim, which in my initial comment I explicitly excluded. This seems to me to be little more than an appeal to the public wish that there be moral responsibility. (Or worse to the fact some people believe in it)
(4) Unpredictability doesn't entail free will otherwise quantum unpredictability would entail that ever particle in the universe is likewise free. Free in the sense of unconstrained is not free will in the ontological sense folks are arguing for. Further this is merely making an appeal to ignorance which is a logical fallacy.
(5) This isn't an argument at all. The question is what the nature of deliberation is. The appeal seems to be to some linguistic meaning. But this then avoids the question of whether the word really fits the phenomena it is applied to or if it is constructed right. It certainly doesn't provide an argument and avoids the issue entirely. At best it provides just the kind of lack of argument we found in (1) and (2).
(6) doesn't seem to entail free will in the least.
(7) isn't an argument for free will only an argument against determinism. The rejection of determinism doesn't logically entail free will. Further (7) is exactly the kind of argument I was referring to by, "our psychological desire for free will." If our brain needs the idea that we are free to function it doesn't follow that it is right! Further it is not at all clear to me that this is true anyway. There appear to be many people who do believe they are determined who live life quite well.
So I'm sticking to my guns on this one. While some of the above may be persuasive to people none of them really provides any objective reasons for believing in free will. Which is not to say it isn't true, just that there aren't any arguments I've found that aren't just theology or an appeal to our pre-existing (and ultimately circular) beliefs or desires.
Oh, I've just skimmed this (though I looked at D.'s paper -- it looks good) but I wanted to amend the statement, 'Folk psychology is usually wrong'.
Now I wouldn't say that. I think folk psychology is as valid as any more scientific theory (probably because it's based on centuries of *empirical* research, i.e. cultural life!) but *within its limited sphere*.
We know a good deal about the world around us -- well, about certain parts of the world around us, namely, the parts that *are* around us.
Very well put. I have only a few points to contribute:
1) Sometimes Blake's appeals to our being able to deliberate, reason, etc. seem more like reasons why he can't accept compatibilism rather than an argument against the compatibilist an his position. He dismissing the compatibilist's "as if" reason, deliberation, choice, responsibility as not being good enough while not really showing to the compatibilist why he shouldn't think them good enough either.
2) I agree with Alex that the failures of folk psychology should not be exaggerated. Folk psychology is VERY effective and we successfully use it to our advantage every time we interact with other people. The problem I see with (1) is its appeal to introspection as if the mind were transparent in some Cartesian way. We simply do not know how our own minds work very well at all. Then, I imagine this is exactly what you meant by "folk psychology."
I think we have to distinguish between useful and true with regards to folk psychology. Folk psychology in a certain quite limited realm is very useful. It isn't true.
To add, my views on folk psychology and most anything similar are reasonably close to Peirce's. (Although I'm far less of a conservative than him - conservative in the sense of being too skeptical of change) I've discussed Peirce's view on this which are somewhat influenced by the Scotish approach to common sense. Here, for example, was my post on Critical Common-Sensism.
I might do a write-up on folk psychology though for the week of science blogging that starts today.
Jeff, I find it pretty hard to accept compatibilism. Semi-compatibilism is a bit more interesting although I don't necessarily find Fischer and company faring significantly better than the compatibilists. What I find problematic is that even if one accepts incompatibilism it doesn't follow that free will is true. It seems to me that those who, right now, are in the strongest position argument wise are the incompatibilists who argue there is no free will and no responsibility. This may lead to revisionist accounts of each that attempt to rescue as much of our common-sense notions as possible. Although while I'm very interested in such accounts I've yet to see any fleshed out in a successful fashion.
Clark: First let's get clear on what the disagreement is. You say that all arguments for "free will" are either "emotional" (whatever that means) or "theological." I disagreed and offered a number of arguments that I said were neither. Now you shift the disagreement to those that are "not entirely be well supported themselves in terms of public evidence." Of course the two statements you make are not nearly equivalent. I also want to know what you mean by "public evidence." However, my arguments did not aim at giving ":public evidence" and that is because you raise it here for the first time. Nor did I argue that these arguments were knock-down arguments. However, you then shift the ground once again so that the argument needs to be not merely not emotional (whatever that means) and not theological and public, but also "persuasive to people ... [and] really provides any objective reasons for believing in free will." So the argument must now be a-emotional, a-theological, based on public evidence and also persuasive to people on objective grounds. Such a demand is altogether unreasonable and not what we discussed at all.
However, let's look at you arguments for why don't find these arguments persuasive (although it is quite beside the original point we were discussing).
(1) immediate experience of being able to choose one thing or another and the overwhelming sense of having actions that are up to me. Of this you admit: "I agree that we believe actions are up to me and that we choose." So it seems that you in fact believe that we all believe actions are up to us and that we choose. Surely there must be some explanation for this universal belief? The fact is that we cannot fail to believe it because we experience it directly in the act of choosing. We know that we choose just like we know that we have thoughts. However, you really don't believe what you assert, for you follow that with: "However belief alone is not a good ground for reality. I believe many things and many of my beliefs are wrong." So you both believe it and you believe that your belief alone is not sufficient for this belief. Then why do you believe it? Your argument here analogous the standard positivist criterion: "any thing that is not verifiable lacks meaning." However, that sentence couldn't have meaning because it cannot be verified. It is self referentially incoherent. Similarly, "I believe I choose and some things are up to me but I don't believe what I believe is reality." Huh? Surely something has gone badly wrong here.
What has gone wrong is clear. Surely you are correct that merely believing something doesn't make it true if what you assert is "I believe that God exists." However, if the assertion of the belief entails affirming that assertion because it is self-referential, then it cannot be coherently denied. Immediately experiencing something and being unable to coherently deny it is pretty darn good reason to believe it is true. Thus, you end up in the position of "I believe that I am I, but my belief doesn't mean that I exist," while overlooking that the assertion doesn't allow a denial of an "I". Similarly, "I believe that I choose and what I do is up to me and I must do so" entails that you must believe the assertion is true.
2. The will is perfectly active. Of this you say it is just (1) but weaker. No it isn't. The fact is that our very notion of the will entails activity and not passivity. If I choose or will something, then I do something. If something causes me to think it or do it, then I am not the one doing it. So the notion that "I will X" entails that the will is perfectly active. This is an argument from Aquinas that deserves a good deal more discussion. However, my sole point is not that it is a knock down argument that you must assent to in order to be rational, but that it ain't (1) all over again.
3. We are morally responsible. Of this you say: "This pushing the question back a stage without answering it. Moral responsibility depends upon free will but we don't know that we have moral responsibility in a public, objective way. This is compelling only as a theological or quasi-theological claim ..." I don't believe that this is true at all. There are any number of agnostics and atheists who believe that we are morally responsible and thus must give a (non-theological) account of how we can be responsible. I would like to see the argument that asserts that any sound idea of morality entails theism. In fact I happen to know that you reject that assertion so your position here is incoherent -- admittedly in an ad hominem. Further, that we don't know we have moral responsibility in a "public, objective way" just smacks to me of verificationism and I would reject such a demand out of hand.
(4) the fact that we cannot predict what a person will say do or think even with intimate knowledge of that person. You are correct that unpredictability doesn't entail free will -- so I agree with you that far. However, it does entail that determinism has got some explaining to do about why we cannot predict human actions. Further, my point here was really in response to Jeff G. who claimed that "everything we know about physics" entailed the falsity of LFW.
(5) We deliberate. You assert that it isn't an argument at all. You are right that in and of itself it is just an observation. The argument is found on pp. 207-08 of the 1st volume to which I referred. That we deliberate entails that we believe that what we do isn't yet resolved, it us up to us, it depends on how we decide and we have rational control over what we deliberate about that leads to our choice. You don't deliberate about what isn't up to you do you? When was the last time that you deliberated about whether you should choose the sun to come up tomorrow or whether to make it so that you were born two years later than you were?
(6) we undertake purposive behavior aimed at a telos which does not yet exist. Well at least Stewart Geotz here: http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1756 and John DePoe here: http://www.johndepoe.com/MindnotMechanism.pdf disagree with you. The reason is obvious. If our choices are the result of prior a-rational causes then we cannot account for the fact of teleological causation of our actions -- i.e, we envision a possibility that can be achieved by a number of actions that will create something as yet non-existent and not entailed by the prior causes because unless we freely bring it about it won't occur. What doesn't yet exist cannot cause anything in the sense of efficient causation.
(7) we cannot pragmatically live life based on the belief that everything is determined and everything we think, do, say and write was already entailed by the earlier states. I think that you agree with this statement n'est pas? If you do, then you cannot pragmatically be a determinist. You say that this entails only incompatiblism, not LFW. I think that you are correct about that. However, let me press it a but. (8) We also cannot live a coherent mental life believing that we are not responsible and accountable for some of what occurs. That does entail LFW. However, I think that you are correct that (7) doesn't entail (8) -- but I was making a point in relation to Dennett's claim to the contrary of (7). If you also accept (8), then LFW seems pragmatically required.
Isn't the whole "free will vs determinism" argument painted with too broad a brush? I mean, I assume that even the most ardent proponent of free will would argue that we are completely free in our will-- surely we can't freely choose whether we prefer chocolate to vanilla, or the Beatles to the Sex Pistols. Will is intimately tied to desire, and desire is not under our explicit control, so the whole idea of a completely free will seems absurd.
On the other hand, even the most ardent determinist would have to recognize that it certainly appears that we are able to freely choose in some instances, and that this belief is an extremely useful one, and that if things are indeed predetermined, they are predetermined in such a incalculable way as to render the alleged fact of determinism largely irrelevant to daily functioning. So, if complete determinism were in fact found to be true, it would be a particularly useless kind of truth.
So, if we move away from the extremes on each side of the debate, what's really at stake here?
Mike: Everyone that I know who adopts LFW agrees that there are influences, both physiological and psychological, that have some impact on how free we are to choose. The obsessive compulsive person whose brain chemistry pre-determines them to think about danger isn't free to do otherwise. However, we recognize such determining influences as instances where we don't have free will. Further, if we ever choose anything that isn't completely determined by past events, then determinism isn't true tout court. Further, you can cultivate an appreciation of good music by choice and even choose to some extent what you like by the associations you choose to make with foods that you taste. Tests prove that, for example, if you think you are getting wine to taste and someone feeds you chocolate while your sight is blocked that you will find the chocolate disagreeable even if you otherwise like chocolate -- and for Clark's benefit, who doesn't like chocolate?
Blake: If everyone recognizes that there are some instances where we are not free to choose, the question becomes one of degree. Obviously, one could follow Nietzsche, or Freud, or Schopenhauer, and put an emphasis on the strength of the determining influences, or one could follow Sartre (for example) and put an emphasis on the (perhaps illusory) free choice.
My question is: why does it matter which way we choose to view it? If we are free, we are not completely free-- and if we are determined, we are determined in such a non-obvious way as to make it convincingly look as if we were (at least in part) free.
You write: if we ever choose anything that isn't completely determined by past events, then determinism isn't true tout court, to which I respond: how could we possibly know if our choice is determined by past events, if the mechanism of determination is sufficiently complex? And, further, if we could know, what would this knowledge change?
Blake, I won't be able to respond until probably tonight - I'm kind of busy today. I just didn't want you to think I was ignoring you.
Mike: There are legions who declare (I would say pontificate) that we know determinism is true because it is required by the closure of physics. Others adopt a kind of explanatory determinism based on very restrictive formulations of the notion of sufficient reason, asserting that everything must be fully explained by something else and thus our choices are fully explained by whatever explains our choices and so forth.
I agree that we cannot know if determinism is true -- there are indeterministic and deterministic formulations of quantum theory, chaos theory and relativity theory. So I agree with you. I disagree with those who say that we could be determined and yet be free (I am an incompatibilist). I disagree with those who say that if everything isn't determined, we cannot be free (as eliminativists assert). I also claim that no one could pragmatically live their life as if they were fully determined by causes outside of them. The experience of deliberating about and choosing things that are up to me is so overwhelmingly powerful that I cannot shake it. Living a life on the belief that what I choose is entirely caused by factors I cannot control is impossible. It is true that there are causes of my behavior of which I am not conscious -- but I know that only because sometimes I become conscious of them.
So the epistemic issue as to whether determinism is true is open -- and will probably stay that way because all of our most basic theories seem to be construable in either deterministic or indeterministic forms. The immediate experience of consciousness and choosing however, is not open. I know that I have thoughts, that I am conscious of having thoughts, that I sometimes have options among which to choose and that sometimes choose among them are simply facts about my experience.
Clark: I know that you are off science blogging so I can wait.
Blake,
This is off-topic for this discussion, but in #5 point 3 you say, "I would like to see the argument that asserts that any sound idea of morality entails theism." If you really are interested in such an argument, one of the strongest I'm aware of is Franklin Gamwell's "The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory & the Necessity of God". In fact, he's spent the better portion of his career defending just this view. I won't take the time to summarize his position here, but would simply say that if (after reading him, and disagreeing with him) you can come up with a solid counter-argument to his position, I'd be very interested to hear/read it. Not that I'm naive enough to think a compelling counter-argument isn't possible, just that his defense of his central theses is quite convincing.
Richard: I agree that an argument can be made that any kind of objective morality or ethics requires a personal theism to make sense of it. I'm as yet unconvinced by such arguments but I'm open to them. In particular, the more I get into the reductive physicalist view the more convinced I am that no real personal value or ethics can exist if such a view is true.
However, I believe that Clark is not open to these arguments so it is strange for him to suggest that arguments for free will based on the reality of ethical obligations is a "theological arguments." So I guess that in some sense my argument is an ad hominem directed against Clark's position and may end up being a theological argument if the arguments you point to are correct (tho I know almost all atheists and agnostics would disagree). I suppose that is what Clark means when he says that #5 is at least a "quasi-theological" argument.
OK, sorry for the delay.
You have a fair point that I merely focused on "theological" or "emotional" arguments for free will. The reason I rejected most of your arguments were either because they were (in my mind) very bad or simply were the same question pushed down a level. So the appeal to responsibility, while appealing at first, begs the question of what grounds responsibiltiy. And typically responsibility is grounded in free will. So it ends up being circular.
So let's put it a different way. Without those arguments being made more explicit I see no reason to believe they aren't really just the "theological" or "emotional" arguments dressed up in new guises. I recognize you'll disagree. But I'll stick to that position.
With regards to (1) the issue is what it means to choose. So we have to be careful that we don't hide a circular argument. I will admit that I chose a pronoun poorly. By "we" I meant "Americans" or "westerners" in general and not necessarily myself. That is I think there is a belief that we (generic we) choose. However I don't think it can logically follow from that belief that the belief is justified.
Blake: "Immediately experiencing something and being unable to coherently deny it is pretty darn good reason to believe it is true. "
But you add in that "unable to coherently deny it" which I disagree with.
With regards to your view of will you are taking a semantic argument (what the meaning of the word entails) and making a physical claim out of it. That's just as bad today as it was in Anselm's day.
With regards to responsibility the issue is what we mean by responsibility. Clearly some do ascribe responsibility while being atheists. That's why I was careful to add in "quasi-theological." But you're right that I probably should have been clearer about what I mean by theology. Roughly I mean a set of metaphysical commitments independent of reasons held by faith. So in that sense of the term an atheist can hold theological positions.
In any case, it isn't obvious that we are responsible. It seems that responsibility has the same set of problems that free will does.
With regards to deliberation that to me is once again taking a semantic point (which I disagree with) and attempting to make a physical point from it. A no-no logically.
With regards to a telos that's simply not necessarily the case. Any scholastic realist or pragmaticist would disagree with you. If there are real universals of some sort then what you assert simply is false.
With regards to pragmatism, you are still setting up a false dichotomy between determinism and free will. One can reject both. Simply arguing against determinism isn't to argue for free will. I'm surprised you continue to do this several times in your follow up.
In any case you appear to be using "pragmatically" in some sense that is unclear to me. So I'll admit I can't quite follow what you are asserting in that paragraph. As I said, even if we need a set of beliefs to function psychologically and perhaps internally we can't avoid those beliefs it doesn't follow that those beliefs are true. Further we can recognize this. That is we might be able to assert that these beliefs are false even if we must act on them. As I said, clearly this is demonstrably the case given that there are many people who reject free will yet are able to function as human beings without difficulty. So this is just a very odd argument.
The western philosophical approach is to discuss Free Will in terms of a rational agent’s capacity to choose a course of action from different alternatives propositions. This places Free Will at the terminus point of the process. And here in lies the problem. The classical view of decision making is that at the end of an analysis of various propositions we are free to chose one over the others. The specter hanging over this proposition is that of Dr. Libet’s experiments (among other things).
Instead of front loading Free Will, how about rear loading it. While on patrols in Vietnam I was constantly looking for protective places in case we were hit. During an attack was no time to have to stop and look around. In split second decisions, my non-conscious self would have to make the decision and I wanted those alternatives available for consideration. My Free Will was exercised prior to the need to make a decision.
I have no reason to doubt the results of Dr Libet’s experiments as they seem to agree with those of Dr Damasio. What seems to be happening is that decision making is being done at the sub-symbolic level of affective processing. We are creatures created to minimize threat and maximize pleasure. To do this, we stamp our experiences with affective impressments. It is the processing of these affective values which give rise to our decisions. As Damasio has shown, people who cannot access these affective values or affective impressments, cannot make life relevant decisions.
Does this mean that with the murky realms of the sub-conscious lies a diabolical puppet-master? No. The decisions that are made there are made by us. The decisions reflect our view of the world and of our values. Therefore, they are in this very real sense ‘our decisions’. And, we are responsible for them.
When we go through the decision-making process we take various propositions and project them into a created future to see which has the best fit. We think we are doing this consciously but we’re not. We think we are doing this consciously because we have no way to access this sub-symbolic processing. For us it is not there. It doesn’t break into our awareness. Thus we believe we do it at the conscious level because the conscious level is all we have.
With this system of decision-making, Free Will is exercised by back-loading effective propositions into this system prior to needing to make a decision. Our Church leaders remind us to fill our mind with correct principles. With these effective propositions being available for affective processing, our decisions will be in line with what we believe.
This may sound like we are little affective automatons but such is not the case. Remember at the core of our affective being is the need to minimize risk and maximize pleasure. More often than not, we gain one at the expense of the other. That’s good because there must be opposition in all things.
Rich
Rich: I can see how you came to your conclusions about the implications of Libet's experiments. That is one way to look at the data. I am, however, critical of the methodology and interpretation of Libet's experiments. I'm not alone. A seminal work was published last year by MIT Press entitled Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? There are several studies that give alternative explanations of Libet's experiments and critiqued his methodolgy.
The results of Libet's study have been replicated many times using essentially the same experimental set-up. In the most recent edition of the Journal of Cognitive Science there is a follow-up entitled "Manipulating the Experienced Onset of Intention after Action Execution." The set-up is as follows: Participants were placed in a setting where there was a clock that had a dot that moved around a clock face. The participants were asked to move a cursor to pinpoint the location where the moving dot was on the clock when they "first felt the intention to move" a finger and where the dot was when they actually made the movement of the finger. Here is my problem: what is actually being measured is the feed-back of the location of dot when they felt an intention to move the finger. So what is being measured is not the perceived timing of the on-set of the intention, but visual feed-back of the location of the second hand which of logical necessity only could occur some time after the dot had already moved as perceived. So the on-set of the intention isn't measured but the feedback of the perception of the clock movement in relation to the perceived intention -- and they takes time. So a delay should be expected and is never taken into consideration in the assessment of the results.
Second, what is observed is that there is a "readiness potential" that usually precedes "spontaneous movement". However, this readiness potential is not seen as related to consciousness or intention. Why? How do they know that this readiness potential isn't realted to consciousness?
More importantly, the interpretations of the relation of conscious intention to action assumes that we can pinpoint areas in the brain that are responsible for consciousness -- essentially assuming what is to be proved. However, I think the interpretation of Marc van Duijn and Sacha Bem in "On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will" in Philosophical Psychology 18:6 (Dec. 2005) is more informative. They conclude that the mechanisms supporting consciousness are more globally located in brain activity and that consciousness emerges to provide a self-steered self-organization that arises out of the chaotic EEG and MRI data. In fact recent data show that large populations of neurons throughout the cereberal cortex are involved in conscousness and conscious activity and that these neural populations shift from chaotic behavior to self-organizing patterns as we engage in conscious activity and make choices.
The pleasure maximizing behavior you describe that arises as a matter of unconscious brain activity over which we don't exercise control sounds exactly like the behavior of lower invertebrates to me. Admittedly, however, invertebrates cannot direct their behavior according to correct principles. If our behavior is as you say, then how can we control our behavior according to principles of any sort? More importantly, now could we ever recognize "correct" principles from principles like maximize pleasure and minimize pain that we can do without consciousness?
Clark: As usual we wil have to agree to disagree. Thanks for the conversation and being willing to engage the issues.
Blake, thanks for the Marc van Duijn and Sacha Bem reference. I’ve downloaded the article and look forward to reading it.
The pleasure maximizing behavior you describe that arises as a matter of unconscious brain activity over which we don't exercise control sounds exactly like the behavior of lower invertebrates to me. Admittedly, however, invertebrates cannot direct their behavior according to correct principles. If our behavior is as you say, then how can we control our behavior according to principles of any sort? More importantly, now could we ever recognize "correct" principles from principles like maximize pleasure and minimize pain that we can do without consciousness?
Oh course it sounds like that of the lower invertebrates. God began with the simple and created complexity. The difference between the lower invertebrates and ourselves (among other things) is that we create beliefs through our affective systems. Belief systems interpret events maid available by our senses and chooses response behaviors.
Damasio [Descartes' Error: Emotions, Reason, and the Human Brain] describes a card game experiment in which a play turns over cards from 4 decks. Two of the decks pay $100 and the other two decks pay $50. All 4 decks, at random, forces the player to pay in from his winnings certain amounts. The $100 deck pay back can be quite high. The $50 decks pay ins are much lower. There is no way a player can keep track of the amounts he receives and the amounts he must pay. The player is also hooked up to a polygraph. At first the only thing the polygraph is picking up is responses to winning and loosing. However, after a bit, the polygraph begins to pick up responses prior to or at the time of choosing. As play continued the skin conductance reading increased in intensity. After about 30 plays (the game goes for 100 plays unbeknownst to the player) the player shifts to the safe decks and stays there.
Damasio explains this in terms of phenomenal events being impressed with what he calls somatic marker but which can also be called affective markers. We now know this is done where neurons from the amygdala intercept neurons from the rhinal cortex lead to the hippocampus. Once processed by the hippocampus the event, with its affective marker, retraces its steps and is processed into memory. In the card game, threat analysis is being conducted by the brain as it evaluates the affective markers attached to each event. This is all happening at the sub-symbolic level. At first the polygraph records nothing because there is not enough data by which to make a judgment. As play continues patterns emerge. When the pattern becomes strong enough behavioral changes are instituted and the player shifts to the two decks with the less risk (generally around the 30th play). Remember, the game is setup so that the player cannot consciously determine patterns of play. And yet, behavioral changes occur and they seem to be in response to processes at the sub-symbolic level. I like to think of this as the creation of beliefs.
When new principles are processed they are impressed with affective markers just like any other object. If it affectively fits existing beliefs it becomes part of the person’s belief system. If it doesn’t fit one’s belief system, it is rejected. Now I know this is not a very sophisticated explanation and the idea is very rough but this is the direction of my thoughts on this matter.
Rich
Blake: Having read the Marc van Duijn and Sacha Bem reference here is where I disagree with them.
A particularly complex form of self-organizing, namely, ‘‘self-steered self-organization’’ (Keijzer, 2003), has strong connotations with intentionality and conscious will (see also Jordan, 2003; Kelso, 1995). Self-steering processes involve internal control parameters that modulate the dynamics of self-organizing patterns into a particular adaptive direction, characterizing dynamical biological processes such as metabolism, morphogenesis, and ontogenesis
However the brain doesn't seem to function in this manner. The brain seems to build belief systems and creates adaptive behavior based on the belief system. We can see this in how the thalamus works (while my description is linear there are a lot of circular dynamics going between the thalamus and other parts of the brain). All the sensory inputs have a connection to the thalamus. The thalamus has a very basic model (belief system) of what is normal sensations. If it detects a sensation outside of the model it immediately alerts the amygdala. All that is known at this time is the sensation is outside of the model. The amygdala is the origin point for instructions for the body to fight or flee It is the center of our emotional and physical responses. or at least it begins the process that leads to these. Immediately after the alert the amygdala receives a bit of serotonin to calm it. In the mean time the thalamus sends the sensory information to the cerebral cortex for further analysis. The reason for the serotonin is to allow the cerebral cortex time to analysis the sensory data. Once analyzed the cerebral cortex sends a message to the amygdala to stand down (the sensory data has been identified as not a threat). Or, it can send the amygdala the all systems go and pre-existing behavior patterns are put into action.
If the signal is stand down then signals are not only sent to the amygdala but also back to the thalamus. If enough signals come back that this even is safe then the thalamus includes events such as this as part of the acceptable model (or the thalamus' belief system). The story doesn't end there. The rhinal cortex is where all the sensory cortexes converge prior to being sent to the hippocampus where the sensory event are placed within a spatial context. As I mentioned before, neurons from the amygdala intercept the neurons from the rhinal cortex prior to being received by the hippocampus to impress emotional meaning on to the event. Once finished with the hippocampus, the event plus it's emotional meaning follows the pathway back to the cerebral cortex to be laid down as memory. It is here that the event and it's emotional meaning are integrated with pre-existing beliefs systems It may be that the event cannot be subsumed by one of our belief systems. Cognitive dissidence is the result. As this point it may need the conscious attention of the human organism to resolve the dissidence. If the disruption is great enough it may cause disruption among many of the belief systems to the point that the processes are overwhelmed and the system begins to break down. This break down is what we call clinical depression.
The whole process unfolds at the sub-symbolic level and therefore it is not available for introspection. While it is at the sub-symbolic level, the process is above the synaptic level of neurons. These beliefs are collections of events and affections which are distributed over the synapse of memory neurons. What holds the belief systems together are the affective impressments each event receives. Thus when new events pass through the thalamus and go to the cerebral cortex they are compared to existing beliefs created by earlier events and emotional meanings in memory. Thus we don't react to events directly. We react to how our previously created belief systems interpret these events. Notice, the whole process is not self-organized but rather organized around affective markers.
Also, part of our affectedly created belief systems is correlated with specific behavior patterns. Thus our behavior is tied to specific beliefs and the affective markers associated with those beliefs. Now this doesn't come close to answering all the questions about consciousness or conscious free will but I think the answer lies in a better understand of somatic markers and their role in preserving us as a species. Look what happens in sensory deprivation experiments: the mind/brain goes completely unstable. Or, look at the inability of those who try to make decisions while unable to access affective markers.
Conscious will could then be envisaged as a self-steering neural mechanism generated by the collective, self-organized activity of neurons, providing the brain with a tool to rapidly switch between existing coordination dynamics, and to stabilize them when necessary, in order to achieve a particular behavioral goal.
Regardless how fast the authors believe this process can be, it is far to slow for self-preservation. If we had to stop and go through the decision-making processed outlined here, our species would never have survived. Speed is acquired when events are analyzed by existing belief systems and appropriate behaviors are immediately initiated. All of this is done at the sub-symbolic level. In order to increase the speed of reaction, the amygdala is warned even prior to analysis by the cerebral cortex. Thus when the cerebral cortex says go, the amygdala does not have to ramp up. It is already to go.
We go through life reacting on the basis of our belief systems and the behavior they initiate. For the most part we are comfortable with them and therefore they seem 'rational' to us. It is only when our belief system initiated behavior results in dissidence that we call into question our beliefs. In order to change behavior we have to change our beliefs. In order to change beliefs we must go through the affective process which created them in the first place. This is why beliefs established through trauma are so difficult to change. We are seldom able to create the affective intensity needed to alter such beliefs. Sometimes belief systems don't change and the mind works to minimize as much as possible the dissidence. Thus we can have conflicting belief systems. The classic one is Thomas Jefferson's belief that all men are created equal while owning slaves.
Free will is associated with behavior: will I do this or that. Behavior is initiated by our belief systems. The only time we have problems is when we have competing belief systems. We must choose the one over the other in order to obtain the most desired behavior. We don't act without reason. Reason is found in belief systems whose foundation is affection.. It is the 'why' behind what we did. In order to have free will there must exist opposing belief systems. There is no free will when there is no choice. To provide alternatives we must create alternative beliefs. The 'wanting' to create or alter beliefs must also originate in a belief. Because it is there that we find the 'why' to explain the effort to change. Thus Free Will probably arises when belief conflicts arise to the level of consciousness.
I apologize to Clark for the length of this posting. I probably should have had it printed and sold as a book. :)) But is does explain why I believe that Free Will and behavior (rational or otherwise) is organized around the idea of affective systems.
Rich
Actually I always enjoy your comments. I may be the rarity among bloggers, but I like the long informative posts. (Although I sometimes wish I had the time to edit some of mine down by half)
Here is a small addendum. (Small for me that is) I just came across this information. It turns out that when we work on logical problems activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus show up in PET scans. Interestingly this is also an area involved with language. Arithmetic skills however seem to process through the left parietofrontal network. (One is located in the front of the brain and the other towards the rear) This area is associated with vision and spatial organization. It turns out that in order to learn to access deductive logic access to the parietofrontal systems needs to be suppressed. Soon after being born babies already access the arithmetical function of the parietofrontal system. Logical functioning come on line later concomitant with the development of language. Because of this, visuospatial techniques tend to be used to solve problems requiring deductive logic abilities. That in and of itself is interesting but hardly on point.
An interesting event happens when the suppression is used with threat, activity in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex appeares. This is the area associated with emotional imprinting. Without the threat the left inferior frontal gyrus processes deductive logic without reference to right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. It would seem as long as the use of logic has no relevance relating to ourselves the somatic markers are not accessed. It would seem that the processes we use to resolve issues relating to ourselves are different from logic use with no relation to ourselves. This would seem to indicate that the systems science use resolves conflicting scientific issues are different from the systems we use for resolving issues related to ourselves.
This and the previous posting has made me alter a bit my understanding of Free Will. It now seems to me that Free Will is used in order to resolve belief conflicts that can’t be resolved at the non-symbolic level and that cannot be compartmentalized. The issue is then raised to a higher conscious level for resolution. At this level, we may or may not have access to logical tools but if we do it is probably only in the evaluation of affectively created belief systems. The ultimate Free Will decision would be based on relative merits of the affective imprinting.
If this is true, in the Jamesian sense, then it has ramifications for how we process religious truth, mentioned in one of your earlier pieces. But that is another discussion.
Rich
Rich: Here is the problem I have with merely attributing a "belief systemn" to various areas of the functioning brain. It leaves completely unexplained how the phenomenal awareness of conflicts arises at all. Look at the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance that you point to. How could various areas of the brain "realize" that there is conflict in beliefs at all? We have merely functioning systems here and it leaves completely unexplained the phenomenal qualities of the very higher-order processes you speak about like "compartmentalizing" "resovling" and even having access to logical tools.
The second problem I have is equating the processing of sensation with the processes of "emotional meaning" -- whatever that means. You speak of the brain "integrating emotional meaning with prior belief systems" and conclude that "cognitive dissonance is the result." That is such a leap from emotional processing in the brain to the higher order awareness of what beliefs are, how they relate to one another logically or cognitively, and awareness that they conflict logically or cognitively. How does the symbolic awareness arise at all -- that is the gap that is infinitely wide between brain processes and your descriptions of free will as I see it.
Finally, the linear description given, without paying attention to the entire neural network and its interaction giving rise to emergent symbolic or higher order awareness leaves the entire explanation begging the question. How are brain processes related to the integrated unity of our awareness of beliefs or phenomenal experiences? How are we are that there are choices to deliberate about and how are we are that deliberation could lead to awareness of a better alternative to choose? How could free will be based on "relative merits of the affective printing"? Further, how does "awareness of a conflict" causally interact with anything at all? Awareness is not a material thing or brain process, so how does it cause anything in the brain at all?
Whoops, I became aware that I misspelled something! How did I have such an awareness of correct spelling? The last two lines should read:
How are we aware that there are choices to deliberate about and how are we aware that deliberation could lead to awareness of a better alternative to choose? How could free will be based on "relative merits of the affective printing"? Further, how does "awareness of a conflict" causally interact with anything at all? Awareness is not a material thing or brain process, so how does it cause anything in the brain at all?
Because of this, visuospatial techniques tend to be used to solve problems requiring deductive logic abilities. That in and of itself is interesting but hardly on point.
That's rather interesting to me given Peirce's consideration that logic was graphical. (He derived what are called existential graphs which isn't well known by most people) He had some rather interesting graphical notation to handle logic, especially his three valued logic.
This would seem to indicate that the systems science use resolves conflicting scientific issues are different from the systems we use for resolving issues related to ourselves.
Once again terribly interesting to me since Peirce makes a similar assertion. However this was long one of the places I thought Peirce quite wrong. Indeed I still find his assertion troubling. Of course he wasn't making a cognitive point but rather made a separation between individual belief and assertion within science. He suggests that the individual when considering belief to action ought be conservative, roughly following societal norms. (This in contrast to say the progressivism of William James) Science however doesn't do this. Thus the individual scientist treats resolving scientific conflict significantly differently from resolve issues related to ourselves.
Quite fascinating. Although even if we do have a cognitive tendency to do this I'm not sure it is a good thing. It may well have developed evolutionarily in a fashion akin to the justification Peirce gives to it.
BTW - Rich, do you mind if I pass your comment along to Peirce-L?
Clark, of course not. I am very appreciable of the space you give me to discuss these things. I have heard that Dewey had some ideas about the relation of reason with the body. Any such ideas from Peirce?
Blake, thanks for responding. I appreciate it. To begin with I think you’re asking me ultimately to define consciousness. I can’t. Nevertheless, you ask very good questions. I am the first to admit that what I presented was an outline that needs to be filled in. And your questions are of a great help to me. Ten years ago I found myself in the psych ward of a VA hospital. I was diagnosed as being permanently disabled with PTSD do to childhood trauma and combat trauma. That began my quest to find out what happened to me. So this interest in how the brain works and what is free will has a very personal aspect to it for me.
Here is the problem I have with merely attributing a "belief systems" to various areas of the functioning brain. It leaves completely unexplained how the phenomenal awareness of conflict.
1. Belief Systems. I’m using the term here to mean ‘models’ or ‘patterns’. Both terms seem too passive for what I’m trying to describe. Belief systems are then expected patterns of the existing world plus their evolutionary relevance (defined by affection) to the person. They are created overtime as events are collected along with their affective meaning.. They reside in long-term memory and are used to evaluated incoming events for the survival of the person and propagation of the species.
In Damasio’s card game, each event of turning over a card was processed into memory along with their affective imprinting. Thus if the card showed a gain or a loss the body responding affectively and the affective response was impressed on the event. Over time, as play continued, patterns began to emerge in the sub-symbolic level of affective processing. As the patterns of risk was reinforced by continual events of turning cards, the intensity of the affective response increased. Concomitant with the intensity of the pattern came behavioral changes leading the player to avoid certain decks in favor of the safer decks. All this proceeded at the non-conscious level of affective processing. Should the player be asked the reason for his behavioral change he probably would only be able to say that he is not sure except that he feels that this is what he should do. This is what I mean by the creation of a belief system.
We have merely functioning systems here and it leaves completely unexplained the phenomenal qualities of the very higher-order processes you speak about like "compartmentalizing" "resolving" and even having access to logical tools.
We know the brain compartmentalizes. The most extreme manifestation of that is multiple-personality disorder. I lived with a woman so inflicted for 20 years. Evidently a trauma so severe occurs to a a young child that the event cannot be integrated in the child’s personality and a partition is created for that traumatic event so that the child can function without constant references to the terror of that event. Dissociation is another less severe form of compartmentalization. Here the person has the ability to dissociate the emotional content of an event from the event itself. I suffer from this. Compartmentalization is a nature function of how the brain works.
Resolving. I guess I mean here ‘integrating’. In personality disorders the emotional content of an event is so severe that the event cannot be integrated with the existing belief systems. Severe compartmentalization is the result.
Access to logical tools. This was sheer supposition on my part. In the experiments dealing with suppression of visual/spatial activity in order to encourage linguistically related deductive logic where threat was used affective systems appeared. The question arises is there some connection between the two centers of processing? I don’t know. However there is a chance that such connection exists and the experimenter also raised that issue.
The second problem I have is equating the processing of sensation with the processes of "emotional meaning" -- whatever that means.
It is the event associated with negative feelings of positive feelings. Thus we hold in memory not only the event but also it’s emotional meaning. Anyone who has gone through a traumatic event understands that the affective meaning of the event can alter future behavior.
You speak of the brain "integrating emotional meaning with prior belief systems" and conclude that "cognitive dissonance is the result." That is such a leap from emotional processing in the brain to the higher order awareness of what beliefs are, how they relate to one another logically or cognitively, and awareness that they conflict logically or cognitively. How does the symbolic awareness arise at all -- that is the gap that is infinitely wide between brain processes and your descriptions of free will as I see it.
In the card game, awareness was concomitant with the intensity of the affective processing that occurring as the game proceeded. As the game progressed the intensity of the affective process increased. I’m assuming that at a particular level of intensity the mind/brain becomes aware of this affective process. This is not as strange as it may seem. One of the aspects of awareness in the mind/brain is sensing the constant influx of information from the body. It works as background for our awareness and for normal thinking. Without this constant influx the mind/brain ceases to be aware and becomes extremely unstable. This was shown by sensory deprivation experiments. Since the mind/brain is already designed to be ‘aware’ of its bodily senses, it seems logical that as affective intensity increases in affective processing at some point the mind/brain will become ‘aware’ of its existence. [I guess I would define awareness in terms of an organism being able to alter behavior as a result of sensing a change in events.]
How are we aware that there are choices to deliberate about and how are we aware that deliberation could lead to awareness of a better alternative to choose? How could free will be based on "relative merits of the affective printing"? Further, how does "awareness of a conflict" causally interact with anything at all? Awareness is not a material thing or brain process, so how does it cause anything in the brain at all?
This is based on the idea of nested levels of mind/brain processing. Let me explain it in terms of how I see how we use semantic symbols. The pre-linguistic child perceives objects as a whole in a manner reminiscent of Plato’s forms. A child does not see four legs, a tail, a body, a head and floppy ears and from that determines it is a dog. Also, because of the mind/brain’s natural ability for association chilren automatically associates all animals having dogness as dogs. Therefore the child knows that animal is a dog and trees are trees and people are people and horses are horses and so forth. They don’t mistake a dog for a tree or a person or a horse. What they don’t have is a culturally agreed upon verbal symbol by which to designate that dog to other persons. We have here two stratifications: one having to do with awareness of objects and the other having to with verbal symbols.
Let’s take this further. A child is given a candy bar. The child starts to put the whole thing in his mouth. [Children put everything in their mouths. The reason is that the senses in the mouth are the most advanced senses available to the baby. For a baby to learn about his world he needs to put it in his mouth.] You stop the child and show him that one needs to unwrap the candy bar in order to get at the good stuff. The baby is learning all kinds of associations. The wrapper becomes associated with the real candy bar. Once the child gets the bar in his mouth it goes. Here another association is made. The inside candy bar becomes associated with pleasure (taste). This is affective imprinting. The event of the eating the candy bar is imprinted with its affective meaning. Both the event and its affective meaning is processed into memory.
One other thing happens that does not happen with the awareness of dogness and the community agreed upon verbal symbol. Affective imprinting has the power to initiate behavior. Having eaten the candy and received the sense of pleasure, the child now wants more. Memory of the pleasure of the event can now initiate behavioral changes in an effort to repeat that pleasurable event. Behavioral activity is affectively based. Thus we have yet another level called affect processing. With out it, nothing gets done. We now have affective meaning needed for behavioral changes, cognitive meaning which is not phenomenal since it is not available for introspection, and the final level which is verbally symbolic in nature.
Verbal symbolism is not required for behavioral change. I watched as a child drug her mother to a candy display in order to get a candy bar. Behavior began with affection, the wanting of the pleasurable taste. The cognitive objects were in memory as she knew from sight what it was that she wanted. Those two things initiated the behavior of dragging her mother to the candy stand. Latter she will learn a more efficient method of obtaining what she want: verbal symbols. At that time we will be able see the nested levels associated with behavior. First is the affective level which initiates behavior, above that is the cognitive object or event level and finally the symbolic level of speech.
So how do we become aware of the need to initiate behavior leading to getting a candy bar. My guess is that the intensity of the affect of pleasure becomes strong enough that the mind/body becomes aware of its presence. Along with the awareness of pleasure is the awareness of the event of eating a candy bar which is impressed with that particular affection. So this is all bound up together in a belief system. The belief systems states that if I eat a candy bar I can gain the affect of pleasure (something we are genetically programmed to want).
So why don’t we run out and get a candy bar every time this need for pleasure becomes intense enough to make the mind/brain aware of it. Because we have other belief systems. I have one that says if I eat sugar it can result in killing nerves in my body (diabetes). This belief system is integrated with fear caused by the need for self preservation. I now have two belief systems in conflict. It cannot be resolved through compartmentalization or any other conflict resolution techniques that may be available at this level. The intensity of both belief systems is such that a decision needs to be made. Conscious choice is brought on line and a resolution of the conflict between beliefs needs to be made. The final choice will ultimately depend on the strongest affect. Affect is the key to behavior. If I get the candy bar it is because the need for pleasure overrides my fear of self-damage. If I choose the other way it is because the fear of self-damage is greater than the need for pleasure.
Good lord look at the length of this. I think I better stop here.
Rich
Rich, good comments and I like the way you're working through things here. You say: "The intensity of both belief systems is such that a decision needs to be made. Conscious choice is brought on line and a resolution of the conflict between beliefs needs to be made. The final choice will ultimately depend on the strongest affect. Affect is the key to behavior. If I get the candy bar it is because the need for pleasure overrides my fear of self-damage. If I choose the other way it is because the fear of self-damage is greater than the need for pleasure. "
It sounds to me, however, that ther is no decision to be made because it is already programmed into us and already made by the respective strength of various affective states over which we have no control. How is that a choice? How is that free?
If my "choice" is the result of the strongest affect, then calling it a choice seems to be a misconceptualization altogether. Now maybe in choosing something like whether to eat a candy bar, I am just stuck with whether the desire for sugar is greater than the desire to be thin. However, what if the choice is about the kind of person I want to be? As you are aware, studies show that merely imagining the future re-wires my neural memory. Imagining the future literally changes the respective affecive brain activity and neural connections facilitating memory. The strength of my desires and affect is changed by my mere consideration of future possiblities. So there is no sich thing as some stable "affect quotient" to determine which is strongest. Which is strongest depends on what I am thinking about and considering in the moment of decision.
Further, what if I care about the kind of person I want to become? If the choice is between eating a Mars that I must steal to eat, but I also care about the kind of person that I am, then how are these apples and oranges compared and weighted? Maybe I could decide in the moment of choice just what kind of person I want to be and thus transform and rewire my affective desires just by considering what I shall be if I steal and what I shall be if I don't. In deliberating I am changing my past associations and memory and thus changing the kind of person that I am, who I am and what I am.
Further, how is rationality possible if what we choose is merely based on the strongest affect as you suggest? I am presented with a logical problem and I decide based on affect what the result is because our affective systems are governed by causes that are not rational -- in fact, they are always pre-rational because the pleasures we will derive occur and decide for us before we can ever reason about it. Certainly what gives us pleasure doesn't follow the laws of logic and rationality. Thus, it seems to me that rationality is impossible on such a view. If that's true, why are we wasting time reasoning at all? We ought to just emote or something like that.
Finally, just what are the neural or brain corelates for the assertion: "conscious choice is brought on-line"? What does a conscious choice being brought on-line look like in terms of brain correlates? I have suggested that it looks like the self-ordering brain processes in which global chaotic neural activity spontaneously self-organizes in a self-ordering out of chaos. Certainly it doesn't look like just one part of the brain having neural activity because every brain state is just the brain having neural activity. So I guess I am back to the global self-ordering processes that I started with in my first comment to you.
It sounds to me, however, that there is no decision to be made because it is already programmed into us and already made by the respective strength of various affective states over which we have no control. How is that a choice? How is that free?
It is not a choice and it is not free but it is a reality. Let me give you an example. I’m driving down a road and the trees on both sides of the road have been cut down. Immediately I’m on Highway 1 going from Saigon to the Cambodian border. I’m super alert to possible ambushes. This event is repeated whenever I drive down such roads. I have no control over that flashback. I have no control over the anxiety I’m feeling or the super alert state I’m in. For all intents and purposes, I’m back in Vietnam. That is one place I don’t want to be. And I’m looking for enemies that aren’t there. This is only one of a number of fear states I automatically revert to given certain external triggers.
I cannot make these beliefs and reactions go away. If I don’t want to be imprisoned by them I must create alternatives that I can chose when these episodes hit me. Some guys never create these alternatives and they go through hell constantly until they kill themselves. I learned that it is not enough to know that what you are doing is dysfunctional. You must also know what is functional in order to correct your behavior. Thus I must create an alternative belief system in order to create choice. No one is going to make me do that. No one can make me. I must make that choice and I must do it freely (that is without being forced to). Ultimately the reason I make the change is that I do not want to go through the despair that accompanies these episodes. If I didn’t care there would be no change. So even here the heart of the matter is affection.
However, what if the choice is about the kind of person I want to be? As you are aware, studies show that merely imagining the future re-wires my neural memory. Imagining the future literally changes the respective affective brain activity and neural connections facilitating memory. The strength of my desires and affect is changed by my mere consideration of future possibilities. So there is no such thing as some stable "affect quotient" to determine which is strongest. Which is strongest depends on what I am thinking about and considering in the moment of decision.
Imagining futures requires pretty much the same areas of the brain as remembering the past. The material we use for building the future comes from our past. So, one would expect brain activity the portion of the brain which houses memory. However, this does not mean that individual memories are being re-wired.
Yes different projected futures and impact the intensity felt by the affects associated by the two events. However, fear is probably the strongest emotion with others ranked below. Regardless, the future you chose is the future you are most emotionally invested in.
Maybe I could decide in the moment of choice just what kind of person I want to be and thus transform and rewire my affective desires just by considering what I shall be if I steal and what I shall be if I don't. In deliberating I am changing my past associations and memory and thus changing the kind of person that I am, who I am and what I am.
Ah if it could only be that easy. It is not that easy, take from one who knows. And it takes time. Your desire has to be very strong. You must meld how you want to be with the strong desire to be that way. Of course desire is a feeling. Thus you can create alternative belief systems from your thoughts combined with your feelings. But then that’s what I already said, free will is exercised in the creation alternative of belief systems prior to the time of decision. If we haven’t done it then, it too late.
Further, how is rationality possible if what we choose is merely based on the strongest affect as you suggest? I am presented with a logical problem and I decide based on affect what the result is because our affective systems are governed by causes that are not rational -- in fact, they are always pre-rational because the pleasures we will derive occur and decide for us before we can ever reason about it. Certainly what gives us pleasure doesn't follow the laws of logic and rationality. Thus, it seems to me that rationality is impossible on such a view. If that's true, why are we wasting time reasoning at all? We ought to just emote or something like that.
This is a real interesting topic and one that most will not agree with me. Man is not rational. He is affective. If we were all rational we would all be conservative Republicans. :))) We think our behavior is rational because it is what most people would do given the set of circumstance in which the choice had to be made. Most of us, I think, when facing the need to make a decision , say to ourselves “How do I feel about this (or that) and make the decision on that basis. Later, when asked why, we come up with good reasons for the choice. But if truth be told the reason was we felt that was the best decision. The explicit reasons are simply backfill.
Logic and reason are processes not facts. The evolutionary function of logic and reason is to provide for the survival of the individual. Therefore they evolved/created in order to meet our affective needs. As mentioned, reasoning which affects the person directly is a combination of affection and logic. Reasoning which does not directly affect the survival of the individual personally, like building a bridge, does not require affective input.
Take for example the man, mentioned by Damasio, who could not make a decision as to when they should meet again, even though he only had two choices to choose from. He brought up an endless list of variables. He couldn’t shrink the list and he could use any of them to make the decision. He also couldn’t access emotional markers. There was nothing wrong with his power of reason so long as choosing didn’t affect him personally. Thus if we are making decisions that affect us personally we use the belief systems (events and objects) which were impressed with evolutionary survival meaning (affections) as the variable used to create a decision. Because decision making is done in working memory only a few variable can be used. How do we select which variable are pertinent and which are not? Most of this is done at the sub-symbolic level.
Metaphorically speaking, we say to ourselves what are the best propositions to use to solve this problem. Then they just pop into our heads. We don’t go down a whole list and check off the ones we want to use. Why do these pop up and not others? I think that since it done at the sub-symbolic level, the ones that pop into mind are the ones most relevant to the problem. And relevancy is determined by the affect component of the belief system in relation to the projected future.
Finally, just what are the neural or brain corelates for the assertion: "conscious choice is brought on-line"? What does a conscious choice being brought on-line look like in terms of brain correlates? I have suggested that it looks like the self-ordering brain processes in which global chaotic neural activity spontaneously self-organizes in a self-ordering out of chaos. Certainly it doesn't look like just one part of the brain having neural activity because every brain state is just the brain having neural activity. So I guess I am back to the global self-ordering processes that I started with in my first comment to you.
So if I give you the neural coordinates of how consciousness in brought on line you will give up the idea of a global self-ordering process? I’m not going to discuss the nature of consciousness for obvious reasons. However, an integral part of consciousness is attention. Roughly speaking the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved with attention.. The emotional states are monitored by the ventral prefrontal cortex. And, the rostral anterior cingulated gyrus acts as an interface between the two. Thus an emotional state can initiate the coming on line of attention and be reflected in consciousness. There is your neural coordinates.
Now before you completely throw away the concept of global self-ordering process, I think I have found just the place for it. At least it does a good job of explaining the organization of belief systems with their evolutionary survival meanings. Since it operates at the sub-symbolic area no executive control can be exercised over it. Events and their affection ( belief systems) must be organized in some methodological and function way. Self-ordering seems to be just the ticket for organizing all this. Plus its organization is a unique to each individual because of unique biological predispositions and unique experiences.
Rich
I think I can give a rough outline of the process from the sub-neural level to the alerting of consciousness. When an event is impressed with its evolutionary survival meaning (affection) it is sent to memory. At the synaptic level changes are made in the dendrite spine. The spine is mushroom shaped with a large head and a narrow neck. It is the head that is connected to the synapse and the other neuron. Neurotransmitters from the other neuron at the synaptic gap create changes in the spine’s head. In the neck, this is converted into an electrical signal. From there it goes to the dendrite and the body of the nerve. Evidently the spine does not have to release the electrical signal until it senses certain activates (undefined at this point). When it finally releases its signal and other spines do likewise the neuron receives them linearly. That is, the strength of the signal from one spine is added to a strength of another signal from another spine and so on. Thus the signal gathers strength.
To go back to the card game, the longer the players played the game the stronger the signals of neuronal activity became. The affective reaction to each hand, evidently, were imprinted in the dendrite spin. I believe what was being monitored by the brain was the results of the choices made. It was probably making a plus or minus threat evaluation of each choice as it relates to each deck, As more and more affective responses occurred, this information was lodged in more and more spines. When more and more spines released their electrical signals the strength of the signals steadily increased. This increased the strength of the electrical activity and the action potential in neurons. As the strength of electrical activity of the neurons increased (and perhaps the increase in the number of neurons involved) the ventral prefrontal cortex became aware of an emotional state. (Remember, this activity is the result of coding affective states at the dendrite spine level.) At a certain point the ventral prefrontal cortex sends its signals to the dorsalateral prefrontal cortex, where attention is activated, through rostral anterior cingulated gyrus. Attention, as I have said, is an aspect of consciousness.
At least that is roughly what I think happens.
Rich
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and Theology
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